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THE TOXIC WORKPLACE OF THE CHILD FARMWORKER
INTRODUCTION
With the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
in 1970, Congress sought to assure a safe occupational environment
for every American worker.' To date, this protection has been de-
nied to children employed as agricultural laborers. The child
farmworker faces the risk now understood to be part of most all
agricultural employment; the risk of exposure to agricultural toxins
which are later found to be hazardous to human life.2 Moreover,
the child farmworker faces additional hazards of unknown propor-
tions because the federal government has thus far refused to recog-
nize the multitude of special dangers which agricultural toxins re-
present to physically immature human beings.3 Among others,
these dangers include increased susceptibility to asthma,4 height-
ened sensitivity to agents that interfere with calcium metabolism,
5
1. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 651-78 (1976)).
2. Commonly known pesticides and herbicides with this kind of case history include
DDT, Aldicarb (also known as Temik), and 2,4,5, trichlororophenoxyacetic acid (popularly
referred to as "Agent Orange"). One of the more recent examples is toxaphene, a pesticide
once heavily used in the production of cotton and soybeans and now restricted to limited
usage because of its identification as "a possible cancer-causing substance." N.Y. Times,
Oct. 17, 1982, at 25, col. 1.
The case history of these substances illustrates that toxicology has not yet been reduced to
an exact science. Consider the following:
Toxicology, like medicine, is regrettably still largely a matter of subjective opin-
ion, especially in the interpretation of experimental animal data. The scientific
basis of toxicology will not be firmly established until our knowledge of the mo-
lecular mechanisms of carcinogenesis, teratology, etc., is as advanced as our un-
derstanding of acute lethal injury. Consequently, expert opinions will change as
basic knowledge increases and leads to more precise and exacting methods of
analysis ....
Parke, Preface to G. VWrrORAZI, INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AsPECTS FOR PESTICIDE CHEMI-
CALS (1979). In the case of the fungicide Captan, for example, Vettorazi has concluded:
"Long-term studies in the rat and mouse have failed to demonstrate any carcinogenic poten-
tial." Id. at 17. One year earlier, a study submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) had found Captan "to be carcinogenic in mice." National Ass'n of Farmworkers Org.
v. Marshall, 628 F.2d 604, 610 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 16-109.
4. See National Ass'n of Farmworkers Org., 628 F.2d at 614 n.42.
5. Id. Other factors contributing to the greater vulnerability of children to pesticide
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and greater vulnerability to reproductive disorders because of the
developing or immature status of the reproductive system.8
The Secretary of Labor, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), and the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) are all arguably vested with some degree of respon-
sibility for insuring the occupational health of the child farm la-
borer,7 but the response of these federal actors to the dangers a
child faces when entering the farm fields to work has been less
than impressive. For the most part, the Secretary of Labor has
confined himself to limiting children's exposure to substances im-
mediately harmful upon contact;" no protection has been provided
against toxins which through repeated exposure may result in con-
sequences equally severe.' The passage of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act was in part prompted by concern for farmworker
safety,10 but judicial interpretation of that legislation has held that
OSHA is without authority to protect farmworkers against agricul-
tural toxins.11 The courts instead have held that the EPA, under
its authority to register all pesticides and herbicides used in this
country,1 2 is required to consider the effects of these materials on
human life prior to granting a registration request.1 3 The EPA has
admitted, however, that it has no data detailing the effects of these
substances on children.
1 4
The plight of soldiers exposed to "Agent Orange" in the fields
of Vietnam stands as testimony to the hazards of imprudent expo-
sure to pesticides, herbicides and similar toxins.15 If a similar trag-
edy is to be averted in the nation's farm fields, a concerted effort
dangers include heightened sensitivity to agents that interfere with the body's use of protein
and greater absorption of toxins in the developing tissues and organs. Id.
6. Id. at 607 n.6.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 16-109.
8. See 29 C.F.R. 570.71(a)(9)(1982).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 27-30.
10. See Organized Migrants in Community Action, Inc. v. Brennan, 520 F.2d 1161, 1167
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
11. Id. at 1169.
12. Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, § 2, 86
Stat. 797 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1976)).
13. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5) (1982).
14. See National Ass'n of Farmworkers Org., 628 F.2d at 614 n.43.
15. See generally Meyers, Soldier of Orange: The Administrative, Diplomatic, Legisla-
tive, and Litigatory Impact of Herbicide Agent Orange in South Vietnam, 8 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REv. 159, 180-97 (1979).
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must be undertaken to eliminate the continued exposure of child
farmworkers to toxins. It will be the position of this Comment that
even if existing legislation were adequately enforced, children
within the agricultural workforce would not receive sufficient pro-
tection against the toxins of their workplace. Instead, the optimum
solution presently lies in the creation of an independent agency,
dedicated to ensuring protection against and compensation for
toxin related illness.
I. ANALYSIS OF THE LAw AND ITS ENFORCEMENT
There are three pieces of federal legislation which theoretically
direct agencies in the federal government to take responsibility for
the safety of children in the agricultural workforce; the Fair Labor
Standards Act,1 which outlaws "oppressive child labor"; the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act,17 designed to improve the safety of
the American work environment; and the Federal Environmental
Pesticide Control Act,'8 passed to tighten federal regulations gov-
erning the use of pesticides and associated poisons. These statutes
are directives to the Secretary of Labor, the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, and the Environmental Protection
Agency, respectively. An analysis of the dangers the child
farmworker faces must begin with an examination of these federal
actors, the extent to which they have responded to the toxin prob-
lem, and the limitations of the statutes under which they operate.
A. Fair Labor Standards Act
Passage of the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was an
express congressional condemnation of oppressive child labor prac-
tices. The heart of the Act prohibits the transportation in inter-
state commerce of goods produced under conditions which Con-
gress had earlier defined as constituting oppressive child labor.19
With the exception of a parent employing his or her own child,20
Congress believed the employment of any child under the age of
16. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 12, 52 Stat. 1067 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1976)).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(1) (1976)).
18. Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 92-516, § 2, 86
Stat. 975 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §136a (1982)).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 212(c) (1976).
20. Id. §§ 203(1), 213(c)(2).
1983]
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sixteen,21 or the employment of a child between the ages of sixteen
and eighteen in an occupation the Secretary of Labor finds to be
"particularly hazardous," 22 should be considered "oppressive child
labor."2 3 Congress also provided that in the event the Secretary
finds that employment of children between the ages of fourteen
and sixteen will not interfere with their schooling or well-being, he
can, by regulation, permit such employment.2 '
The language of the FLSA places an affirmative burden on the
Secretary of Labor to find that no threats or hazards to health ex-
ist before children under the age of sixteen are allowed to enter the
workforce in any industry or occupation. The Act provides, how-
ever, that the agriculture industry is exempt from this scheme,2
and so, as to agriculture, this duty is removed. The FLSA specifi-
cally states that its prohibition against transporting goods pro-
duced by child workers in interstate commerce is not to apply to
"any employee employed in agriculture," unless the Secretary of
Labor has made a finding that a specific agricultural occupation is
"particularly hazardous" for children under age sixteen. 20 Accord-
ingly, unlike other occupations which must prove the absence of a
hazard before fourteen and fifteen year olds can join the workforce,
in agriculture, the Secretary must find a hazard before he or she
can disallow the employment of children under sixteen.
Regulations have been promulgated by the Department of La-
bor which list certain occupations in agriculture considered to be
sufficiently dangerous to constitute oppressive child labor for chil-
dren under the age of sixteen.2 Most of the occupations listed con-
cern the operation of power machinery, 8 but the Department has
also indicated that it considers the handling or application of any
agricultural chemicals classified by the EPA as being in Toxicity
Categories I or II to be of sufficient hazard to justify regulations
barring children from such work. 29 Toxicity Categories I and II for
21. Id. § 203(0)(1).
22. Id. § 203(l)(2). The determination as to whether the employment is "particularly
hazardous" is made by the Secretary of Labor. Id.
23. Id. § 203(1).
24. Id.
25. Id. § 213(c).
26. Id.§ 213(c)(2).
27. 29 C.F.R. § 570.70 (1982).
28. Id. § 570.71(a) (1)-(8).
29. Id. § 570.71(a)(9).
346 [Vol. 32
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the most part consist of those materials which are fatal or seriously
harmful to the victim of accidental exposure.3 0 Those chemicals
which present less of a threat upon first contact, but may pose sub-
stantial or equal risk through repeated exposure, have been ig-
nored. Keeping all of this in mind, it bears looking at the legisla-
tive history and judicial interpretations of the FLSA to determine
if the Department's failure to act in the area of child farmworker
exposure to toxins comports with that law.
1. Legislative history. The legislative history of the 1938 Act
is revealing both for what it says and for what it fails to say. The
Fair Labor Standards Act was first considered by Congress in 1937
in almost identical legislation introduced in the House and Sen-
ate. Both pieces of legislation defined the term "employee" in
30. The EPA is required by the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 136 (1982), to register and control the use and distribution of all pesticides. In the course




Oral LD ....... Up to and including 5 From 60 ithru 0mg/kg.... From 500 thru 500 mg Greater than 5000 mg/
mg/hg. krg. kg.
Inhalation LC... Up to and including .2 From .2 thru 2 mg/liter .... From 2. thru 20 mg/liter .... Greater than 20 mg/liter.
mg/liter
Dormal LD ..... Up to and Including 200 From 200 thru 2000 ........ From 2,000 thru 20.000 .... Greater than 20,000.
mg/kg.
Eye effect.., Corrosive n mreal Corned opacity No corneal opacity, No irritation.
opacity not reversible reversible within 7 irritation reversible
within 7 days days; irritation within 7 days.
persioting for 7 days.
Skin effect.... Corrolve.................. Severe Irritation at 72 Moderate irritation at 72 Mild or alight irritation at
hours, hours. 72 hours.
40 C.F.R. § 162.10 (1982). The warning statements which the Agency requires be placed on
pesticides, again according to toxicity category, are more intelligible to the non-scientist:
Toicity Precautionary statements by toxicity category
category Oral, inhalation, or dermal tonicity Skin and eye local effects
I ....... Fatal (polsonooa) it swallowed [inhaled or absorbed through Corrosive, causes eye and skin damage (or skin irritation]. Do
skin]. Do not breathe vapor (dust or spray mist]. Do not get not get in eyes. on skin, or an clothing. Wear goggles or face
In eyes, on skin, or on clothing [Front panel statement of shield and rubber gloves when handling. Harmful or fatal if
practical treatment required.]. swallowed. (Appropriate first aid statement required.]
II ........... May be fatal it swallowed [inhaled or absorbed through the Causes eye and skin] iritation. Do not get in eyes, on skin, or
skin]. Do not breathe vapors [dust or spray mist]. Do not get on clothing. Harmful if swallowed. (Appropriate first aid
in eyes, on skin, or on clothing. [Appropriate first aid state- statement required.].
ments required.].
III ........... Harmful if swallowed [inhaled or absorbed through the skin]. Avoid contact with skin, eyes or clothing. In cse of contact
Avoid breathing vapors (dust or spray mist]. Avoid contact immediately flush eyes or skin with plenty of water. Get
with skin (eyes or clothing]. [Appropriate first aid statement medical attention if irritation persists.
require.].
IV ......... (No precautionary statemente required.] ................ No precautionary statements required.
Id.
31. Wason, Legislative History of the Exclusion of Agricultured Employees from the
National Labor Relations Act, 1935, and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, in Congres-
sional Research Service MAJOR STUDIES OF LEGISLATIVE REFERENCES 1916-1974, at 8 (1975).
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such a way as to specifically exclude agricultural workers.3 2 The
rationale for this exclusion has been explained as follows:
It is clear that there was never any serious consideration given to drop-
ping the agricultural exemption which appeared in the original wage and
hour bills considered by the Congress in 1937. The efforts [undertaken in the
course of committee and floor debate] were entirely along the line of
strengthening and broadening the application of the exemption, and adding
exemptions in the area of handling, transporting, packing, and processing of
agricultural commodities....3,
It appears as though the scope and form of the FLSA were
strongly influenced by the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), 4 passed three years earlier. The original Senate version
of the NLRA did not exclude agricultural laborers.3 5 When the
question of the bill's coverage was raised, it was initially proposed
to exempt those businesses with a limited number of employees, 3
but there is evidence that the Senate Education and Labor Com-
mittee contemplated an agricultural exemption.3 7 The Washington
State representative of the National Grange s" testified in favor of
such an agricultural exception: "[T]he workability of the Wagner
Bill [the NLRA] would be greatly improved if it were amended so
as to exempt farm labor."3 9 There is little else in the NLRA's Sen-
ate history to indicate any specific intention to exclude
farmworkers from the scope of the Act. Nonetheless, the bill ap-
proved by the Senate carried an agricultural exemption.40
Every version of the NLRA proposed in the House contained
an agricultural exception.41 House debate indicates an intent to
pass protective legislation for farmworkers eventually, but also evi-
dences an awareness that immediate protection was precluded by
political considerations. Consider this statement made by Con-
gressman William Connery:
32. Id.
33. Id. at 10.
34. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1976)).
35. Wason, supra note 31, at 1.
36. Id. at 2.
37. Id. at 3.
38. The National Grange is an organization representing the interests of farmers.
39. Wason, supra note 31, at 3.




[C]ertainly I am in favor of giving the agricultural workers every protection,
but just now I believe in biting off one mouthful at a time. If we can get this
bill through and get it working properly, there will be opportunity later, and I
hope soon, to take care of the agricultural workers42
It is clear that the NLRA provided precedent for excluding
farmworkers from the scope of national labor legislation when
Congress passed the FLSA in 1938.4 3 As to the specific exclusion of
agricultural laborers from the FLSA's minimum wage, maximum
hour, and child labor provisions, it appears to be a case of political
considerations exacting their price." The specific exemptions the
farm industry won were nonetheless considered insufficient by rep-
resentatives of rural constituencies; they feared the legislation
would apply to industries related to farming, for example food
processing, and thereby reduce farm profits." It was also feared
that the overall impact of the legislation would be to drive up the
prices of those goods farmers purchased.46
In short, the legislative histories of the NLRA and the FLSA
contain scant reference to farmworker safety. In both instances,
the operative concerns of the Congress when dealing with workers
employed in the agricultural labor force were economic and politi-
cal.47 There is evidence in the legislative history of the NLRA that
Congress intended to address agricultural safety issues at a later
date,48 and the FLSA itself explicitly authorizes the Secretary of
Labor to prohibit the employment of those under sixteen when
such work poses particular hazard.49 The conclusion to be drawn
42. Id. at 7.
43. There are obvious similarities between the definition of employee-the exclusion of
the agricultural laborer-in the first versions of the FLSA introduced in the House and
Senate and the corresponding definition and exception in the Wagner Act. Wason, supra
note 31, at 8.
44. Id. at 12. Wason writes that congressional supporters of the NLRA believed the
agriculture exemption was needed to acquire the votes necessary for passage of the bill. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 7, 12.
48. Id. at 3.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(2) (1976). It should be noted that the FLSA was enacted over
forty years ago; the dangers of pesticide use were not widely recognized at that time. Federal
poison legislation was nonexistent until some nine years later when Congress passed the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947, ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163 (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 135 (1982)). This legislation was directed mostly towards insuring
adequate labelling. See Note, EPA Pesticide Regulation, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 234 (1976). It
is currently estimated that one billion pounds of these poisons are applied annually.
19831 349
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from this analysis is that no legitimate explanation can be found in
either the FLSA or the statute which influenced it, the NLRA, to
justify the Secretary of Labor's failure to adopt a more active pol-
icy in addressing the dangers child farmworkers face.
2. Case law. Judicial decisions interpreting the FLSA have
held the Act's exemptions are to be "narrowly construed,"50 and
that its provisions are to be interpreted to benefit the children it is
designed to protect. 1 The United States Supreme Court ruled that
exceptions to the FLSA were to be given a narrow construction in
Phillips Co. v. Walling,52 a 1944 case where it was asked to decide
the scope of the "retail establishment" exemption 5 of the FLSA.
The Court stated:
The Fair Labor Standards Act was designed "to extend the frontiers of social
progress.. . ." Any exemption from such humanitarian and remedial legisla-
tion must therefore be narrowly construed, giving due regard to the plain
meaning of statutory language and the intent of Congress. To extend an ex-
emption to other than those plainly and unmistakably within its terms and
spirit is to abuse the interpretative process and frustrate the announced will
of the people."
In Lenroot v. Kemp,55 a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case re-
viewing the refusal of a lower court to issue an injunction to block
further violations of the FLSA, the majority noted that Congress
legislated the child labor provisions of the Act "in the interest and
for the welfare of the children of this country.""6
The holdings of these and other decisions interpreting the
FLSA57 must be considered in light of congressional concern over
pesticide dangers as was expressed by the 1972 passage of the Fed-
McEwen, Pesticide Residues and Agricultural Workers: An Overview, in PEsTICIDE MAN-
AGEMENT AND INSECTICIDE RESISTANCE 37 (1977).
50. Phillips Co. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 489, 493 (1945).
51. Lenroot v. Kemp, 153 F.2d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1946).
52. 324 U.S. 489 (1945).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(2) (1976).
54. Phillips Co. v. Walling, 324 U.S. at 493. The court's construction of the FLSA in
Phillips was not unique. It was echoed in Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., where the court
wrote: "Where exceptions were made, they were narrow and specific." 339 US 497, 517
(1949). See also Wirtz v. Keystone Readers Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 249, 259 (5th Cir. 1969)
("narrow contruction . . . must be given to the retail extablishment exemption in light of
remedial purposes of the Act").
55. 153 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1946).
56. Id. at 156.
57. See supra note 54.
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eral Environmental Pesticide Control Act.5e Further, it bears re-
peating that the language of the FLSA itself expressly provides
that if agricultural work is determined to be "particularly hazard-
ous," children under sixteen are not to be so employed.59 To con-
fine the interpretation of "particular hazard" to contact with those
chemicals fatal or seriously harmful upon accidental exposure, and
to ignore those chemicals which through repeated exposure may
have equally devastating results,60 repudiates the FLSA as courts
have interpreted it. The Secretary's interpretation of the statute
clearly conflicts with the legislative history and judicial interpreta-
tions of the FLSA; both indicate that a more active policy toward
the employment of children under sixteen"" in the often poisonous
environment of agriculture should be adopted.
B. Occupational Safety and Health Act
Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act in
1970.63 The stated purpose of this legislation is "to assure so far as
possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions.... "& The legislative history of the
58. 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1982).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(2) (1976).
60. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
61. Oppressive child labor is defined by the FLSA to include the work of anyone be-
tween the ages of sixteen and eighteen "in any occupation which the Secretary shall find
and declare to be particularly hazardous for the employment of children between such ages
... ." 29 U.S.C. § 203(1) (1976). The term "particular hazard" is identical to that found in §
213(c)(2), where the Secretary is authorized to narrow the exemption for those under six-
teen. Id. § 213(c).
The EPA's pesticide standards represent safe levels for adults, 29 C.F.R. § 575.5(d)
(1982), but workers under the age of eighteen are not adults. Therefore, a narrow construc-
tion of the exemption, a Phillips argument, similar to that made in the text of this Com-
ment for those under sixteen, could conceivably be stretched to apply to all those under the
age of eighteen.
62. The Supreme Court's holding in Heydenfeldt v. Daney Gold Mineral Co., 93 U.S.
634 (1876), provides an alternative rationale to reach the same conclusion. On the question
of statutory interpretation the Court said: "If a literal interpretation of any part of [a stat-
ute] would operate unjustly ... and be contrary to the evident meaning of the Act taken as
a whole, it will be rejected." Id. at 638. Literally, Congress provided for an agricultural ex-
emption, but it also provided the child labor clauses "in the interest and for the welfare of
the children of the country." Lenroot v. Kemp, 153 F.2d at 156. In light of the hazards
presented by agricultural poisons, the Heydenfeldt rationale supports the adoption by the
Department of Labor of a far more active position.
63. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1976).
64. Id.
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Act evidences specific congressional concern for farmworker safety:
"Undeniably, one of the major concerns that prompted OSHA's
enactment in 1970 was the occupational hazard presented by the
misuse of pesticides." 5
Pursuant to this grant of authority, the Secretary of Labor en-
acted emergency, temporary health standards in 1973 to protect
farmworkers from exposure to certain named pesticides through
residue on foliage.8 Fruit growers sued in response to these regula-
tions, and the case was litigated in Florida Peach Growers Associa-
tion v. United States Department of Labor.67 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals took for granted 8 the Secretary's authority to
establish safety standards for farmworkers, but criticized the Sec-
retary's choice of promulgating emergency standards.69 The major-
ity wrote: "The reasons published by the Secretary with the stan-
dards do not themselves evidence a factual need for emergency
standards. The record supports the need for some standards, but
not emergency standards.
7 0
One year later, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia handed down its decision in Organized Migrants in Commu-
nity Action v. Brennan. 1 At issue was whether the responsibility
for farmworker safety was properly within the jurisdiction of
OSHA or, as the government argued, the EPA.7 2 The court's ulti-
mate decision was that the Federal Environmental Pesticide Con-
trol Act (FEPCA) placed farmworker safety within the ambit of
the EPA. 3
The first issue addressed by the court in Organized Migrants
was the statutory authority of the EPA. Appellant farmworkers ar-
gued that FEPCA was passed to address environmental concerns,
not occupational safety, and therefore gave the EPA no authority
65. Organized Migrants in Community Action, 520 F.2d at 1167. See also E. Green-
stone, Farmworkers in Jeopardy: OSHA, EPA, and the Pesticide Hazard, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q.
69, 72 (1976).
66. 38 Fed. Reg. 20, 715 (1973).
67. 489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974).
68. Id. at 124.
69. Id. at 129.
70. Id. at 130. For a critical analysis of the Fifth Circuit's holding in that case, see
Greenstone, supra note 65, at 90-96.
71. 520 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1975).




to act on occupational safety questions 4 The court of appeals was
not persuaded by this argument. It found within the provisions of
FEPCA7 5 a legislative grant of power to act on those occupational
issues raised by the use of agricultural toxins. 76 The majority held:
"Our own analysis of the statute and its legislative history confirms




The court then turned to analyze that section of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act which provides: "[N]othing in the
[Act] shall apply to working conditions of employees with respect
to which other Federal agencies. . exercise statutory authority to
prescribe or enforce standards or regulations affecting occupational
safety or health. '78 The farmworkers claimed that FEPCA did not
preempt OSHA authority. The protection of agricultural laborers
was, according to the appellants, one of the principal purposes of
the OSHA legislation. 9 Furthermore, the appellants argued that
the OSHA mandate of occupational safety was not preempted by a
statute which regulates industry employees in an incidental
manner.
8 o
In response, the court saw nothing in either FEPCA itself or
its legislative history that indicated an intent not to preempt
OSHA.8 1 While the court found that the passage of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act was prompted by concerns for
farmworker safety,82 it also found a clear legislative intent to avoid
duplication: "While giving the Secretary omnibus authority to reg-
ulate occupational safety and health, Congress sought to avoid the
wasteful duplication that would result where another federal
agency was also providing for the occupational safety of a class of
workers." 83 Thus, the issue before the court was not whether
FEPCA was designed primarily to protect the agricultural laborer,
74. Id. at 1164.
75. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1982) (all pesticides must be registered), id. § 136a(c)(5) (ap-
plicant must show the chemical will not have an unreasonable adverse effect on the environ-
ment), and id. § 136(j) ("environment" includes man).
76. Organized Migrants in Community Action, 520 F.2d at 1165-66.
77. Id. at 1165.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(1) (1976)
79. Organized Migrants in Community Action, 520 F.2d at 1166.
80. Id.
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but rather whether that worker was "within the class which Con-
gress sought to protect under that statute. 84 The majority held:
"Since Congress intended that EPA have jurisdiction to regulate
farmworker exposure to pesticides, and since the Administrator is
exercising that authority, the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from
acting.
'85
C. Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act
The Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Acts6 was
passed in 1972 to strengthen existing federal pesticide legislation .
7
The scheme of FEPCA is to mandate the registration of every agri-
cultural poison used in the United States. 8 Registration is to be
granted if the Administrator of the EPA determines, among other
requirements, that: "(c) [I]t [the toxin] will perform its intended
function without unreasonable adverse effects on the environment;
and (d) when used in accordance with widespread and commonly
recognized practice it will not generally cause unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment."89 Under FEPCA, "environment" is
84. Id. at 1169 (quoting Fineberg Packing Co., Inc., 7 0cc. SA^'rv & HEALTH REV.
COMM'N 405, 406 (1974)).
85. Id. at 1169. One commentor has argued that incidental coverage is insufficient to
preempt the OSHA mandate and, were it to be held otherwise, many major industries would
fall outside the scope of OSHA. Greenstone, supra note 65, at 100. As to the problem of two
operative agencies in the field of pesticide and employee health regulation, Greenstone
writes:
Why is OSHA needed as a backup if another agency will enforce the same
regulations? ...
The answer lies in the reason for which the Occupational Safety and Health
Act was passed - to assure every working person safe and healthful working con-
ditions ... the best, and indeed only, way to guarantee such a promise is to
place its enforcement within the power of the working person. The repeated em-
phasis in the provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act on enforce-
ment mechanisms to be invoked by the workers themselves evidences an impor-
tant concept of employee self-protection.
*. .The provisions of the amended Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Ro-
denticide Act protect employees only to the extent that environmental safety is
a consideration and do not envision a system whereby workers can actively pro-
tect their own health and safety interests.
Id. at 103.
86. See supra note 18.
87. 7 U.S.C. § 135 (1970), (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982)).
88. Id. § 136a(a).
89. Id. § 136a(c)(5).
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defined within the Act to include "man,"90 and the applicant re-
questing registration bears the burden of proof.91
The Environmental Protection Agency, in comments revealed
during the course of the litigation sparked by amendments made
to the FLSA in 1977,2 advised the Department of Labor that the
Secretary could not simply rely on EPA standards for setting safe
pesticide exposure levels for ten and eleven year old workers.9 3 The
EPA warned that "the Agency cannot say what is or is not a safe
standard for children simply because there is no data on which to
base such an estimation and the factors involved are much more
complex than for an adult.
94
The effect of the EPA's statement is to call into question the
legitimacy of pesticide registrations granted by that Agency. If
data concerning the effect of the substance on children was un-
available when registration was granted, the Agency could not have
justifiably concluded the material would not cause "unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment"95 since children are part of the
farm environment. The violation being clear, the issue becomes
whether the farmworkers have access to a remedy. There are two
avenues of redress potentially available to the laborers: challenging
initial registration approvals, or initiating cancellation
proceedings."
90. Id. § 136j).
91. While the statute does not explicitly place the burden of proof on the applicant, it
does provide that:
The Administrator shall publish guidelines specifying the kinds of information
which will be required to support the registration of a pesticide and shall revise
such guidelines from time to time. If thereafter he requires any additional infor-
mation he shall permit sufficient time for applicants to obtain such additional
information.
Id. § 136a(c)(2). The administrator is also given the power to request the data supporting
the claims the applicant makes. Id. § 136a(c)(1)(D).
92. Washington State Farm Bureau v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1980).
93. Id. at 303. See also infra text accompanying notes 110-25.
94. Washington State Farm Bureau, 625 F.2d at 303 n.12.
95. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5) (1982).
96. A third mechanism provided for in FEPCA, suspension, will not be discussed be-
yond this footnote. Suspension is a more drastic proceeding which allows the Administrator
to immediately revoke registration if "necessary to prevent an imminent hazard," id. §
136d(c)(1). The measure is by its nature temporary and is linked to the initiation of cancel-
lation proceedings: "No order of suspension may be issued unless the Administrator has
issued or at the same time issues notice of his intention to cancel the registration." Id.
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1. Challenge of initial registration approvals. FEPCA pro-
vides that an applicant refused registration may request a hearing
to challenge the denial." While there is a provision for interested
persons to comment prior to approval of an application for regis-
tration,98 no clause exists within the Act granting interested parties
the right to administrative review of a decision to grant a registra-
tion request. In Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle,99 the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals was presented with challenges
made to an EPA decision concerning the cancellation of a pesticide
registration. The court's opinion noted: "Decisions by the Adminis-
trator to deny registration of pesticides may be challenged in an
administrative hearing, but not decisions to grant registration. '" 100
Precluded from seeking administrative remedy, the alternative
for the farmworkers is judicial appeal. As to district court review,
the pertinent section of FEPCA provides: "(a) District court re-
view. Except as is otherwise provided in this subchapter,. .. final
Agency actions not committed to Agency discretion by law are ju-
dicially reviewable in the district courts."' 1 The majority in Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund offered the following comments as to the
scheme of the 1972 pesticide legislation: "The pattern seems to be
. . . [that] persons seeking more stringent regulation may sue in
the district court without first enduring an administrative hearing;
those complaining of regulation as too strict must first exhaust
their administrative remedy of a formal hearing before seeking ju-
dicial review. 1
2
97. Id. § 136a(c)(6).
98. Id. § 136a(c)(4).
99. 631 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
100. Id. at 937.
101. 7 U.S.C. § 136n(a) (1982).
102. 631 F.2d at 937 (emphasis deleted). It is not clear whether farmworkers are enti-
tled to judicial review by a court of appeals. Again turning to FEPCA:
(b) Review by court of appeals. In the case of actual controversy as to the valid-
ity of any order issued by the Administrator following a public hearing, any per-
son who will be adversely affected by such order and who has been a party to the
proceedings may obtain judicial review by filling in the United States court of
appeals...
7 U.S.C. § 136n(b) (1982). One of the problems presented here is whether the laborers
should be considered "a party to the proceedings." At this time, participation is limited to
the opportunity to submit comments prior to the approval of a registration. Id. § 136a(c)(4).
Further, while this grant of a registration is in order under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 393 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1982)),
it is arguable whether a public hearing has been held. For an analysis of some of these issues
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FEPCA provides that the Administrator's approval of an ap-
plication for registration of a pesticide is to be set aside if it is
found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law."' 10 3 While this standard is not as
rigorous as the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) "substantial
evidence" test,104 the practice of granting registrations when the
EPA itself admits there is no data showing the effect of these sub-
stances on children, would appear to constitute a violation of the
law.
2. Initiating cancellation proceedings. Under FEPCA, can-
cellation proceedings are to be initiated "[i]f it appears to the Ad-
ministrator that a pesticide or its labeling or other material re-
quired to be submitted does not comply with the provisions of this
subchapter or, when used in accordance with widespread and com-
monly recognized practice, generally causes unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment . .. ""'. While this language does not
contain an explicit provision allowing for comment by interested
parties, the court of appeals in Environmental Defense Fund held
that "a party. . . may petition the EPA to issue an unconditional
cancellation notice and obtain district court review of any refusal
to do so."~10 The operative test by which a reviewing district court
in the context of a preliminary cancellation proceeding, see Environmental Defense Fund,
631 F.2d at 922.
103. 7 U.S.C 136n (1982). Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the term "license"
is defined to include registrations, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (8) (1982). The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, in World Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C., 595 F. 2d 897 (2d Cir. 1979), commented
upon the treatment of licensing under the APA:
Although licensing constitutes "adjudication", 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) and (7), this
does not make an application . . .subject to an evidentiary hearing since 5
U.S.C. § 554 applies only to "every case of adjudication required by statute to be
determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing", and § 556, so
far as it deals with adjudications, applies only when a hearing is required by §
554.
Id. at 901.
If a proceeding comes within the scope of §§ 554 and 556, it is subject to the more
rigorous "substantial evidence" test of the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982). In the case of
pesticide registration, however, there is no requirement that the decision be made on the
record after an opportunity for an agency hearing. As a result, § 556 is not applicable and
the "substantial evidence" test likewise does not come into play. Instead, the validity of the
Administrator's approval of a registration request is measured by the APA's "arbitrary and
capricious" standard. Id. § 706(2)(A).
104. Id. § 706(2)(E) (1982).
105. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b) (1982).
106. 631 F.2d at 936.
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is to evaluate EPA's refusal of a cancellation request is again the
arbitrary and capricious standard of the APA. 10 7 As before, in light
of the absence of data detailing the effects of pesticides and other
agricultural poisons on minors, it would seem that the Administra-
tor's decision not to initiate cancellation proceedings should be
found to be violative of the law.
In theory, then, it appears as though child farmworkers are
protected in their work by both the Secretary of Labor and the
EPA, although the authority of OSHA has been undercut by the
holding in Organized Migrants.10 8 In practice, as the above discus-
sion illustrates, that protection is simply nonexistent. It seems
ironic that the federal government would see fit to establish regula-
tions telling the American worker not to use the top rung of a step-
ladder,109 while at the same time permitting farmworkers as young
as twelve to expose themselves to substances which are linked to
cancers, asthma, and other serious ailments. An analysis of recent
case law in Section II further demonstrates the inadequacy of cur-
rent protections afforded child farm laborers from the effects of
these materials.
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
The FLSA was amended in 1974 to permit children as young
as twelve to take their place in the agricultural workforce, again
with the usual exemption allowing children younger than twelve to
work on farms owned or operated by their parents.110 Amendments
made in 1977 authorize the Secretary of Labor to issue waivers al-
lowing ten and eleven year olds to enter the farm fields and assist
in the harvest of short-season crops."1 The issuance of these waiv-
ers hinges upon a finding that "the level and type of pesticides and
other chemicals used would not have an adverse effect on the
health or well-being of the individuals to whom the waiver would
apply."
112
Pursuant to this legislation, the Department of Labor issued a
proposed rule in April of 1978. This proposed regulation required
107. Id. at 935.
108. 520 F.2d at 1161.
109. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.25(d)(xii) (1982).
110. 29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
111. Id. § 213(c)(4).
112. Id. § 213(c)(4)(A)(iii).
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an employer, for each field in which ten and eleven year old labor-
ers might work, to identify those standards of the EPA, OSHA, or
comparable authorities which established that children would not
be adversely affected by pesticides used.13s When the EPA pro-
tested that its standards had been set for adults and not chil-
dren,""' the Department of Labor amended its proposed rule in
June to require that the applicant-grower either submit a state-
ment that pesticides or associated poisons were not used on the
crop to be harvested,1" 5 or that sufficient time had passed since the
application of the toxins to make reentry safe for ten and eleven
year olds."6e The Department then commissioned an independent
consultant to analyze the pesticide standards of the EPA and to
suggest modifications, where necessary, so as to establish exposure
levels that would comply with the 1977 amendments. Based on
these studies, the Secretary issued a final rule' 17 listing particular
poisons which, when used as specified, would meet the waiver's
standard of no "adverse effect."1 8 Less than one year later, the
Department issued additional rules which removed from this ap-
proved list of poisons the fungicides Captan" 9 and Benomyl.2 0
Litigation arose on two fronts in response to the regulations
promulgated. In the District of Columbia, the National Association
of Farmworkers sought a court order enjoining the Secretary from
issuing any waivers. The Association argued that the rule specify-
ing pesticides acceptable to the waiver's standards was both sub-
stantively and procedurally inadequate.' In another action initi-
ated several months later, Oregon and Washington State
strawberry growers challenged the removal of Captan and Benomyl
from the approved list. 22
In the District of Columbia suit, plaintiff farmworkers sought
a judgment holding that the Department of Labor's regulations
reconciling the use of certain pesticides with the requirements of
113. 43 Fed. Reg. 14068, 14070 (Apr. 4, 1978) (proposed 29 C.F.R. § 575.5(d)(2)).
114. See Washington State Farm Bureau 625 F.2d at 299.
115. 43 Fed. Reg. 26562, 26567 (June 21, 1978) (proposed 29 C.F.R. § 575.5(d)(2)).
116. Id.
117. 43 Fed. Reg. 36623 (Aug. 18, 1978), amending 29 C.F.R. § 575.5(d).
118. 29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(4)(A)(iii) (Supp. IV 1980).
119. 44 Fed. Reg. 22059 (Apr. 13, 1979), amending 29 C.F.R. § 575.5(b)(2).
120. Id.
121. National Ass'n of Farmworkers Org., 628 F.2d at 611.
122. Washington State Farm Bureau, 625 F.2d at 301.
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the 1977 waiver legislation were in violation of that legislation, and
also in violation of the notice and comment requirements of the
APA. In the lower court, plaintiffs had been denied the injunction
requested; the judge refused to prevent the Secretary from apply-
ing the challenged regulations. 123 The court held that the Depart-
ment's standards were not violative of the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" test of the APA.
124
The opinion of the court of appeals is primarily an analysis of
the merits of the lower court's refusal to grant the preliminary in-
junction.125 The majority recognized that irreparable injury would
result from such refusal:
Here plaintiffs represent children who might work as hand harvesters if
the Secretary is not enjoined from administering the waiver provision accord-
ing to the challenged regulations. As a result, these children would be ex-
posed to the pesticides and chemicals approved by the Secretary for use ac-
cording to the listed "minimum entry times . .. ."
The risk of harm from such exposure pendente lite would not be elimi-
nated even if plaintiffs ultimately were to win on the merits.
126
The court found that another consideration in granting an injunc-
tion, the public interest, also weighed in favor of the farmworkers:
We must ask what is the proper balance between the economic burdens to
growers denied waivers, a burden ultimately shifted to consumers, and the
irreparable harm to children exposed to pesticides and chemicals through em-
ployment allowed waivers? Once again, the balance must be struck in favor of
the protection of children.
127
The court also considered whether "the petitioner made a
strong showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits of its ap-
peal." 2 The majority criticized what it perceived to be a presump-
123. National Ass'n of Farmworkers Org. v. Marshall, No. 79-1044 (D.D.C. May 4,
1978).
124. National Ass'n of Farmworkers Org., 628 F.2d at 612.
125. Id. at 613-16.
126. Id. at 613. The court also considered harm to other parties. It was the majority's
opinion that should an injunction be granted, waivers would still issue but in far fewer num-
bers and only upon satisfactory conclusion of a more difficult proof process. Id at 614. While
the court recognized that an injunction would therefore reduce the availability of the ten
and eleven year old workers, id. at 615, it also noted the "industry obviously survived with-
out any 10- and 11-year-old hand harvestors during the extended period preceding ..
1977... ." Id. The court dismissed as insignificant the harm which the other party in this
case, the Department of Labor, argued an injunction would impose upon it. Id at 615-16.
127. Id. at 616.
128. Id. at 613.
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tion by the district court that the passage of the 1977 waiver legis-
lation required the issuance of some waivers.129 The court found
that the proper focus of the litigation was a determination of
whether the Department of Labor met the statutory requirements
before issuing waivers.130 While the majority approved of the Sec-
retary's decision to simplify the procedure and list acceptable
chemicals,131 it found that there was no data to support the list the
Secretary had prepared.3 2
The court criticized the district court's opinion that science
could not now, and possibly never would be able to, provide the
"requisite assurances of safety.' 1 33 The majority noted that the
consultant's studies were conducted under considerable time pres-
sures13 4 and that an employee of the consulting firm had testified
"that existing methodologies, applied to this special case, would be
helpful, and feasible, 'time permitting.' "135
Finally, the court responded to the district court's argument
that since complete assurances of safety were impossible, the ex-
isting standards were sufficient.3 6 The majority held that while
safety could not be absolutely proven, 37 "such a proposition must
not permit a court to substitute its view for the statute's explicit
requirement. '" 1 The court accordingly concluded that an injunc-




133. Id. at 618.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 619.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. Having weighed the substantive merit of the Association's arguments, the court
of appeals then turned to consider the procedural issues. It found that the standards at
issue were "clearly ... subject to the notice and comment procedures required by the APA,
5 U.S.C. § 553." 628 F.2d at 620. In addition, the court found that with the exception of the
initial regulations-those which had proposed reliance on the EPA, OSHA, and comparable
authority-the Labor Department standards had not been subject to notice and comment.
Id. at 620-21. The majority wrote:
[G]ood cause to suspend notice and comment must be supported by more than
bare need to have regulations. Especially in the context of health risks, notice
and comment procedures assure the dialogue necessary to the creation of reason-
able rules. The government concedes that the challenged regulations are its first
attempt to set protectives standards for children employed under the agriculture
waiver provision. This is exactly the kind of standard which especially needs the
utmost care in its development and exposure to public and expert criticism.
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tion must issue "in the interests of justice - if not plain decency.
,39 It ordered that waivers under the 1977 amendments were
not to be granted by virtue of the rule listing pesticides acceptable
to the Secretary until that rule underwent notice and comment
procedures.
140
The growers in the Ninth Circuit litigation challenged the ini-
tial removal of the fungicides Captan and Benomyl from the list of
approved poisons. The lower court read the 1977 waiver legislation
as demanding only compliance with the EPA Preharvest Interval
standards, standards with which all growers must comply before
sending any workers, whether children or adults, into treated fields
to harvest crops."" Finding that the strawberry growers had con-
formed with these EPA requirements, the court concluded that the
Secretary of Labor had violated his statutory duty in not granting
the waivers.
14 2
The Ninth Circuit first addressed the issue of selecting safety
standards. The court rejected the district court's ruling that the
Secretary was bound to adopt the EPA Preharvest Interval stan-
dards.143 The majority noted that the EPA itself had protested
that its standards were appropriate for adults, but not children.144
The court also found it significant that the independent consulting
firm retained by the Department of Labor had warned that even
though it had added time to the period during which children
could not reenter the fields,145 further study was necessary to as-
sure safety.
146
The court made additional arguments against a blanket reli-
ance by the Department of Labor upon the EPA. The majority ob-
served at the outset that the exceptions to the FLSA are to be
narrowly construed. 14 Further, it noted the 1977 amendments re-
Id. at 621.
139. Id. at 623.
140. Id.
141. Washington State Farm Bureau, 625 F.2d at 301.
142. Id.




147. Id. at 304. As its authority, the Ninth Circuit cited the decisions in Mitchell v.
Kentucky Finance Co., 359 U.S. 290, 295 (1959) ("It is well settled that exemptions from the
Fair Labor Standards Act are to be narrowly construed"), and Brennan v. Keyser, 507 F.2d
472, 477 (9th Cir. 1974) ("Only those businesses clearly within both the terms and spirit of
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quire the employer-applicant to submit "objective data";14 s Con-
gress did not name the EPA as the exclusive source of such infor-
mation.149 The court reasoned that if the EPA were to be the sole
source of data, and if compliance with the EPA's standards were
sufficient to justify issuance of a waiver, then ten and eleven year
olds could work on any farm: "It is obvious, however, that if Con-
gress wanted only compliance with EPA standards, this existing
scheme would make the waiver provision's pesticide condition su-
perfluous, since growers would presumably have to comply with
EPA standards regardless of the harvest workers' ages."15 0
The court then moved to consider the Department of Labor's
actions concerning Captan and Benomyl.1 51 The majority found
that the evidence before the Labor Department concerning these
substances was sufficient to support the decisions made. 52 Since
the growers had not submitted objective data showing these two
fungicides to be safe, the court concluded that the Department was
reasonable in developing its own information.153 The data gathered
for the Secretary by the consulting firm indicated that Captan was
carcinogenic and Benomyl mutagenic and teratogenic. 4 The ma-
jority also noted that:
The report [of the consultants] recognized that it was scientifically reasona-
ble to assume that children are more susceptible than adults to toxic effects
and that it was particularly important to protect them against chronic or
delayed effects on the reproductive system, central nervous system and other
organs developing in preadolescents. 155
The final issue before the court was procedural: Had the De-
the exemption should be allowed to benefit from it"), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975).
148. 29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(4)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
149. Washington State Farm Bureau, 625 F.2d at 304.
150. Id.
151. The district court, upon conclusion of a trial de novo, found that the Secretary had
acted in a manner that was "arbitrary and capricious." Id. at 305. The Ninth Circuit criti-
cized the district judge's decision to hold a trial de novo. Id. The majority found that under
the APA's "arbitrary and capricious" standard, the review of an informal rulemaking pro-
ceeding is to be conducted on the basis of the evidence before the agency when the decision
was made. Id. Further, "[t]o the extent the district court might properly have looked
outside the administrative record, it failed to limit its review to background information,
explanations of the record, and information needed to determine whether the Secretary con-







partment of Labor violated the law by failing to conform with the
notice and comment requirements of the APA prior to removing
Captan and Benomyl from the approved list?156 The majority ruled
that there was "good cause" to stray from these procedural re-
quirements and that the situation thus fell under the exception 157
provided in section 553(b) of the APA.15s Given the onset of the
strawberry season, the urgent need to protect children, and the ne-
cessity of informing growers, the court found that the notice and
comment procedures were impractical. 9
The holdings of these two cases illustrate the inadequacy
which has characterized the federal government's response to the
problem of child farmworker exposure to toxins. With the author-
ity of OSHA swept away by the holding in Organized Migrants,
the Department of Labor has relied unjustifiably upon the efforts
and expertise of the EPA. The authority given the EPA to act on
this problem is only incidental to the power given the Agency to
regulate pesticides, 160 and thus far child farmworkers have been
treated by the Agency only incidentally. The difficulties facing
children in trying to influence the priorities of a federal agency
without access to either the voting booth1 61 or significant financial
resources162 are obvious. Furthermore, these children are dealing
with hazards which only a mature and trained scientific mind can
fully appreciate. Consequently, even if these workers had access to
the resources necessary to influence the federal government, there
is little reason to expect that an effort would be exerted for that
156. Id. at 306.
157. Id. at 307.
158. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982).
159. Washington State Farm Bureau, 625 F.2d at 307. The court saw no inconsistency
between its position and that of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals decision, wherein
failure to comply with the APA mandates was held to be fatal:
Our conclusion of good cause for bypassing notice and comment procedures is
not inconsistent with the D.C. Circuit's conclusion that time for these proce-
dures was necessary "to insure sufficiently protective regulations for issuing
waivers" while the statute protected children in the interim. Adequate protec-
tion of the children was the purpose and effect of the challenged actions here
while such protection was found lacking in the agency's actions approving the
use of pesticides in NAFO.
Id.(citation omitted).
160. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
161. The right to vote is limited to those older than 18. U.S. CONST. amend. 26, § 1.
162. Farmworkers are typically paid minimal wages. See U.S. DEI'T OF COMMERCE, 1981




III. POTENTIAL REMEDIES FOR THE OCCUPATIONAL DANGERS FACED
BY CHILD FARM LABORERS
The question now becomes whether existing legislation, if ade-
quately enforced, would provide effective protection, and further-
more, whether existing legislation will ever be adequately enforced.
Rather than attempting to reinvigorate statutes which have proven
ineffective, the best solution may lie in the creation of an indepen-
dent agency dedicated solely to these concerns. As with any rem-
edy, the effectiveness of a solution to the child farmworker's di-
lemma will depend upon the extent to which it recognizes the
unique characteristics of the group it seeks to serve. In light of the
weakness characterizing the financial and political voice of farm
children, it may be that any solution which depends for its effec-
tive enforcement upon an agency vested with equally serious re-
sponsibilities to other diverse constituencies should be suspect, for
it runs the risk of losing farm children in the shuffle to respond to
the other concerns. 165
A. The Potential for and Effectiveness of Rigorous Enforcement
1. Department of Labor. As previously indicated, the statu-
tory scheme currently in place would allow the Secretary of Labor
to make a finding that work with agricultural poisons is "particu-
larly hazardous. ' ' 164 That determination would justify a prohibition
of employment of not only those under age sixteen,65 but those
163. Tort law does not presently offer an adequate remedy to the plaintiff who as a
child worked as an agricultural laborer and now finds him or herself stricken with, for exam-
ple, cancer. For an excellent discussion of the limitations of tort doctrine in recovering for
an illness the cause of which, like cancer, cannot be definitively linked to one incident, see
Note, Tort Actions for Cancer. Deterrence, Compensation and Environmental Carcinogen-
esis, 90 YALE: L.J. 840, 847-55 (1981). The author discusses some of the legal problems a
plaintiff faces, including difficulties of evidence, multiple causation, and proximate
causation.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey recently allowed recovery against a maufacturer for
tortious failure to adequately warn of the hazards of its product, even though those hazards
were unknown at the time of manufacture. Bashada v Johns-Mansville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J.
191, 477 A.2d 539 (1982). See also Nat'l L. J., Jan. 17, 1983, at 15, col. 1. If developed
further, this theory might offer some relief to farmworkers, although it is not clear whether
it provides an adequate solution to the problems of causation, etc., mentioned above.
164. See supra notes 19-61 and accompanying text.
165. 29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(2) (1976).
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not yet eighteen as well.1 6 There are difficulties with this ap-
proach, however, not the least of which is the already noted intran-
sigence with which the Department of Labor has responded to the
problem up to this point. In view of the intentional exclusion of
the agricultural laborer from the principal protections of both the
NLRA167 and the FLSA,65 it is possible that the Department does
not consider the safety of the child farmworker to be within its
purview. Whatever the rationale, it seems imprudent to entrust the
responsibility for the minor farm laborer with an agency which has
responded with silence169 to explicit congressional concern over
both oppressive child labor17 0 and pesticide hazards.
17 1
Even if the Secretary of Labor adopts a more active policy, the
scope of the remedy provided would necessarily be limited by the
legislation under which he or she would operate. Presumably, any
regulation prohibiting the employment of children under sixteen,
or for that matter under eighteen, on farms using certain named
pesticides would have to meet the "arbitrary and capricious" test
of the APA. 7 2 Given the uncertainties of current knowledge, this
may represent a substantial hurdle. Furthermore, even though the
Secretary of Labor has the power to declare agricultural occupa-
tions "particularly hazardous" for minors, 3 this power does not
extend to situations where a child is employed by his parent or
guardian.
174
166. Id. § 213(1) (2).
167. Id. § 151.
168. See id. §§ 213(a)(6), (b)(12), (c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). The FLSA prohibits the em-
ployment of a child under sixteen in any occupation, id. § 203(l)(1) (1976), except those, like
agricultural, specifically exempted. In the exempted industries, employment of those under
.sixteen is allowed unless the Secretary makes a finding of particular hazard, id. § 213(c)
(Supp. IV 1980).
169. The only action the Secretary has taken thus far is to prohibit the employment of
those under sixteen in the handling or applying of agricultural chemicals of immediate and
severe toxicity. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. This regulation ignores the
hazards of indirect exposure to poisons, exposure which occurs when the laborer works
among plants whose foliage is coated with pesticide residue. Furthermore, the hazards posed
by persistent chemicals, those not fatal upon first contact but equally dangerous through
continued exposure, are ignored.
170. See 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1976).
171. Congressional concern is evidenced by both the passage of FEPCA, 7 U.S.C. § 136a
(1976), and the creation of OSHA. See Organized Migrants in Community Action, 520 F.2d
at 1167.
172. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).




2. OSHA. Unlike other departments and agencies, occupa-
tional safety is not merely an incidental concern for OSHA, but
rather its primary purpose.1"5 Its cost-benefit analysis is unique in
that it places special emphasis on worker safety.17 Its expertise in
dealing with substances like carcinogens was recognized and relied
upon by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in deciding Na-
tional Association of Farmworkers Organizations.177 In fact,
OSHA owes its existence, at least in part, to congressional concern
over farmworker safety.
178
The principal difficulty in recommending OSHA as the solu-
tion to the child farmworker's problems is the holding in Organ-
ized Migrants.'17 While that decision has been criticized, 80 it has
not been overturned. Unless that case is reversed, or until Congress
definitively indicates that existing pesticide legislation' 8' is aimed
at protecting the environment, and not the farmworker, reliance
upon OSHA does not represent a workable remedy.
3. EPA. Since 1972 the EPA has operated under the man-
date of FEPCA,ls2 which requires the registration of all agricul-
tural poisons used in this country.18 3 Registration is not to be is-
sued unless the Administrator finds that the poison "will perform
its intended function without unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment."' 184 Furthermore, such unreasonable adverse effects
should not result when the substance is "used in accordance with
widespread and commonly recognized practice.'
8 5
Unlike the FLSA,'ls the remedy available under the FEPCA is
not confined to children between the ages of twelve and eigh-
teen. 8 7 The practice of farmers employing their own offspring at
175. Id. § 651.
176. Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation,
33 VAND. L. REv. 1281, 1316-17 (1980).
177. 628 F.2d at 614.
178. See Organized Migrants in Community Action, 520 F.2d at 1167.
179. Id. at 1161.
180. See Greenstone, supra note 65, at 69.
181. 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1982).
182. Id.
183. Id. § 136a(a).
184. Id. § 136a(c)(5)(C).
185. Id. § 136a(c)(5)(D).
186. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1976).
187. The FLSA allows children under eighteen to work in any industry unless it is
"particularly hazardous" to them. Id. § 203(1). Children under fourteen are allowed to work
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essentially any age is so common that it was recognized in the
FLSA itself.""" Thus, no registration can be issued unless the ef-
fects of these poisons on teenagers and young children are ade-
quately considered.
The problem with this remedy is obvious; the EPA has not
been particularly receptive to farmworker concerns. It has had ten
years in which to implement completely the statutory mandates of
FEPCA and yet, as the cases discussed within this Comment indi-
cate,189 it has made little progress toward meeting that goal. Thus
the efficacy of any remedy resting with the EPA is dubious.19 0
There is simply too great a potential for the EPA to ignore the
plight of these children in its effort to respond to other diverse and
pressing concerns.
B. Alternative Solutions
One possible answer to the child farmworker's dilemma in-
volves the passage of new legislation. For any new statute to pro-
vide a viable solution to this problem, it must combine elements of
maximum risk avoidance with compensation for inevitable injuries.
This combination is necessary because the scientific evaluation of
the hazards these poisons present is both subjective and indefi-
nite.191 Any such scheme must also provide for workable record
keeping, since the injuries these materials inflict often remain la-
tent for months or years. Furthermore, for the scheme to have any
impact at all, it must maintain independence from both the agri-
in agriculture unless there is particular hazard. Id. § 213(c)(2). Twelve and thirteen year
olds may be employed in agriculture with the consent of their parents, id. § 213 (c)(1)(B),
although the bar of § 213(c)(2) is still applicable. Ten and eleven year olds, employable by
virtue of the amendments made to the FLSA in 1977, are presumably less in need of protec-
tion; they may not work until the Secretary finds that "the level and type of pesticides and
other chemicals used would not have an adverse effect on the health" of the workers in-
volved. Id. § 213(c)(4)(iii) (Supp. IV 1980).
188. See id. § 203(1) (1976); id. § 213(c)(2).
189. See supra notes 121-60 and accompanying text.
190. In addition, it should be noted that workers falling within the protection of OSHA
are beneficiaries of that Agency's unique cost-benefit analysis. See, Pierce, supra at note
176, at 1316-17. In contrast, farmworker safety is simply one of many factors to be consid-
ered in the registration of a pesticide; "unreasonable adverse effect" is defined as "any un-
reasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and
environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide." 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (1982).




cultural and pesticide industries.
The optimum solution would involve the creation of a new
agency to register and apply the pesticides and associated chemi-
cals currently used in this country. A manufacturer seeking to mar-
ket a poison would submit that poison to the agency along with
research detailing the hazards the material poses to agricultural
workers of all ages.192 The agency would in turn classify the sub-
stance as prescription or nonprescription, 93 with a heavy presump-
tion that a substance should be classified as prescription. Nonpre-
scription materials would be available as are over-the-counter
drugs currently. If a farmworker suffered an injury which was sus-
pected to have been caused by exposure to a nonprescription
poison, the usual tort 94 remedies would be available.
Prescription pesticides would be applied at the farmer's re-
quest by trained agency employees. The agency would record the
material used, the farm where it was used, and the date of use. The
agency would also receive copies of the W-2 forms for all the
farm's employees at the end of each year. If at some later date an
employee developed an illness, he or she would contact the agency
and provide proof of that ailment. The agency would then check
its records to determine where the employee had worked and to
what materials he or she was exposed. If the employee developed
lung cancer, for example, and was exposed to materials suspected
of causing lung cancer, the employee would be entitled to an
award. The award would be based partially upon the individual's
life expectancy, 1 5 but would also include compensation for pain
192. This data would be evaluated according to the same standards any respected sci-
entific journal uses before it agrees to publish material. For a discussion of how scientific
publications evaluate articles submitted and of critcisms which the method has engendered,
see M. O'CONNOR, THE SCIENTIST AS EDITOR 28-40 (1979).
193. This classification would be made according to statistics indicating the risk the
substances pose. For example, if a group of people, when exposed to a certain material as
farmworkers would be, contracted twenty-five percent more cancers or suffered thirty per-
cent more miscarriages, the material would be considered a prescriptive toxin. The
percentage figure chosen would be affected by, among other things, the adequacy of the data
supporting registration. If an applicant submitted data of poor quality, registration, and
thus the right to market the product, would be denied. On the other hand, exhaustive re-
search detailing the hazards of a product would weigh in favor of a higher percentage figure,
and thus a greater likelihood of classification as non-prescription.
194. For an analysis of litigation involving exposure to toxins, see generally Birnbaum,
Toxic Substances: Problems in Litigation, 170 PRAc. L. INsT. 1 (1981); Birnbaum, Toxic
Substance Litigation, 151 PRAc. L. INST. 1 (1980).
195. If a thirty year old were suffering from a terminal cancer, he or she would be
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and suffering.
The cost of this award would be divided among manufacturers
according to their share of the market in the years during which
the employee was exposed. If the employee handled two materials
suspected of causing lung cancer, for instance a fungicide and a
pesticide, the award would be apportioned accordingly. Manufac-
turers would be entitled to reduce the award upon a showing that
the employee acted in such a way as to increase his or her chances
of developing the ailment1 96 or that the farmer employing the
worker was negligent.1 97 In the latter case, the farmer would share
responsibility with the manufacturer.9 8
CONCLUSION
The promise of a safe work environment made in 1970 has yet
to be realized by the child farmworker. While in theory protected
by the Department of Labor, OSHA, and the EPA, the minor agri-
cultural worker in fact has received no recognition of the special
hazards he or she faces when exposed to agricultural toxins: The
EPA continues to violate the law by registering poisons even
entitled to a greater award than a fifty-five year old with the same ailment. If a particular
toxin caused a birth defect, the award would be influenced by the cost of care and therapy.
196. Following the example of a farmworker contracting lung cancer, manufacturers
would be entitled to reduce the award by showing the employee smoked.
197. Negligence could be shown, for example, where the farmer ordered his employees
back into the field before the recommended waiting period had passed.
198. If new information revealed that a nonprescription pesticide would more properly
have been classified as prescription, the employee could pursue the usual tort remedies. In
the alternative, if the farm laborer could prove employment on a farm that, for example,
grew potatoes, and the laborer was suffering from an ailment that a nonprescription pesti-
cide typically used on potatoes was now recognized as or suspected of causing, the laborer
would be entitled to an award. Again, the amount would be apportioned among the manu-
facturers according to their share of the market for that particular substance. If the classifi-
cation error was made in good faith, the award would be the same as that given had the
poison initially been classified as prescription. If the error was made in bad faith, substan-
tial punitive damages would be paid to the worker. Failure to reveal new information con-
cerning the hazards posed by a currently registered material would be considered bad faith.
As part of the cost of concluding its pesticide manufacturing operations, a manufacturer
would be presented with two options: If it continued to exist as a corporation, it could agree
to accept liability, though no longer an active member of the market, for the latent illnesses
its products prove to cause over the next twenty-five years. In the alternative, if the corpo-
ration so chose, or if the organization was dissolving, it would be required to purchase an
insurance policy to handle its potential liability over the next twenty-five years. In the latter
case, if the corporation were dissolving because of bankruptcy, payment of the insurance
costs would be a claim of the highest priority.
CHILD FARMWORKERS
though it has no data detailing the effects of these materials on
children.199 The authority of OSHA to act has been undercut by
the holding in Organized Migrants.20 0 While the Secretary of La-
bor has taken steps to limit the extent to which children handle
toxins that pose an immediate threat of death or serious bodily
harm,20 1 the consequences of frequent exposure to chemicals less
immediately harmful but ultimately as hazardous have been
ignored.
The children who work on American farms lack the means to
influence effectively the federal bureaucracy.20 2 Nonetheless, if the
laws passed for their protection were more rigorously enforced, at
least limited relief would be offered. The Secretary of Labor could
prohibit the employment of children under sixteen,20 3 or for that
matter children under eighteen,20 4 in agricultural occupations that
use pesticides or similar materials. This would offer no protection,
however, to children employed on their parents' farms. The EPA
could include child farmworkers in the cost-benefit analysis
FEPCA directs be performed before the issuance of any registra-
tion for an agricultural toxin,20 5 but this would relegate children to
a position of being one of many incidental concerns the EPA
weighs before granting an application for registration. 208 This is far
different from the protection given workers falling within the am-
bit of OSHA.207 OSHA represents an attractive solution, but no
longer has authority to act on the subject.
208
The creation of a new agency designed to serve as the
farmworkers' advocate on these matters presently represents the
best solution. Given the characteristics of the victims herein in-
volved, a passive response, one depending upon active victim par-
ticipation and involvement to be effective, is no response at all.20 9
Moreover, any such remedy must recognize the complications
199. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
200. 520 F.2d at 1161.
201. 29 C.F.R. § 570.71(a)(9) (1982).
202. See notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
203. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(2) (1976).
204. See id. § 203(l)(2).
205. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1982).
206. See supra note 190.
207. Greenstone, supra note 65, at 103.
208. Organized Migrants in Community Action, 520 F.2d at 1169.
209. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
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caused by the long latency period of many of the illnesses linked to
toxin exposure210 and the uncertainties surrounding current knowl-
edge of toxicology.211
More effective enforcement of existing legislation or the crea-
tion of a new agency may provide an answer to the problem of
child farmworker exposure to toxins, but in a very real sense they
represent a response to a symptom and not to the disease. The
simpler and more logical solution to the farmworkers' dilemma lies
in a rethinking of our attitudes toward the use of these toxins.
Americans annually apply approximately one billion pounds of
pesticides, herbicides, and like material to their land, livestock,
and often to themselves.212 The ultimate effect of many of these
materials is unknown, and the residue of poisons applied in one
growing season will often be present in the environment for many
years thereafter. Ironically, at the same time these materials are
used to eliminate the insects and diseases which reduce crop
yields, the federal government maintains a program for paying
farmers not to cultivate land so as to lessen harvests and maintain
reasonable prices for farm goods.21 In effect, the agriculture indus-
try uses toxins to artificially increase the crop yields which the
government has puposefully and artificially decreased.
The exposure of child farmworkers to lethal toxins represents
an unnecessary tragedy caused by this incongruous thinking.
Americans must accordingly reevaluate their attitudes toward pes-
ticide use, but in the interim the need for more effective enforce-
ment of present laws or the creation of a new agency to oversee the
use of toxins will remain. The immediate challenge is to protect
farm children; the long-term goal must be to develop a comprehen-
sive program for the use of toxins in agriculture.
ARLENE M. HIBSCHWEILER
210. See Note, supra note 163, at 851.
211. See supra note 2.
212. McEwen, Pesticide Residues and Agricultural Workers-An Overview, in PESTI-
CIDE MANAGEMENT AND INSECTICIDE RESISTANCE 37 (1977).
213. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. § 1281 (1982).
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